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I
INTRODUCTION

Identifying the essential characteristics that distinguish a profession from
other service occupations is a common exercise. Perhaps a better way to
judge the degree of professionalism, however, is with reference to the ease or
difficulty of precisely specifying a provider's performance obligations in
advance of the provision of services. For most medical services, the range of
possible exigencies is so great that no imaginable contract or regulation could
explicitly state the physician's duty under all of them. Efficiency in the
delivery of such services therefore requires some departure from a pure
contractual or regulatory model. Accordingly, society imposes special ethical
and legal requirements on persons who are regularly employed by clients, not
to bring about a specific, definable result, but to exercise specialized
knowledge and skills on their behalf.'
Tort law recognizes the inefficiency that can arise because of the
disadvantages under which consumers labor in dealing with professionals by
making certain obligations to clients an incident of professional status. 2 The
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1. Thus, professionals are generally expected to act ethically in their individual dealings with
clients and to work collectively to ensure that other practitioners adhere to high standards of
performance and conduct. As antitrust actions involving professionals have shown, there are certain
risks to society in letting an entire profession act in concert. See, e.g., National Soc'y of Professional
Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); American Medical Ass'n v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 638
F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980), affid by an equally divided Court, 455 U.S. 676 (1982); see also Havighurst, The
Doctors' Trust: Self-Regulation and the Law, HEALTH AFF., Fall 1983, at 64. There are, however, strong
theoretical justifications for looking beyond market and contractual mechanisms for the protection of
uninformed consumers of medical services. Compare Arrow, Uncertainty and the IWelfare Economics of
Mledical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941 (1963) (a classic article finding benign explanations for
nonmarket institutional arrangements), with P. STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN

MEDICINE 226-27 (1982) (faulting Arrow for too readily accepting profession-inspired trade
restraints).
2. When tort doctrine is viewed in these terms-as assigning duties on the basis of professional
status-it is essentially prescriptive and regulatory, an expression of community values and public
policy. See e.g., W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 4 (5th ed. 1984) (defining a tort as a

"breach of duties fixed and imposed upon the parties by the law itself, without regard to their intent
to assume them, or their efforts to evade them"). It is possible, however, to take another view of the
function of tort rules establishing the rights and duties of parties who are not strangers to one
another but have a commercial relationship. In such circumstances, tort rules can be seen as terms of
an implied contract by which the law allocates risk according to a combination of factors, including
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thesis of several contributions to this symposium on medical malpractice,
however, is that efficiency also requires that the legal system tolerate certain
private agreements that seek to alter in some way the rights and
responsibilities thus legally prescribed. This article, in pursuing this theme
further, considers not so much whether but precisely how-that is, by what
contractual formulation of service obligations-the substantive duties of
health care providers3 might be varied by private contract. 4 Consideration of
the drafting problem naturally requires, however, some comment on the
merits of the standard of care embodied in malpractice law and of particular
attempts to alter that standard.
II
THE LEGAL PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF CUSTOMARY PRACTICE

The impossibility of precisely articulating in advance the performance
required of a health care provider under all possible circumstances explains
why professional custom has been widely used as a benchmark for evaluating
a professional's work. 5 Indeed, if there is to be accountability at all, any
specification of the obligation of true professionals to their clients must at
some point have reference to what other professionals would do under the
same circumstances. It is therefore not surprising that the law of medical
malpractice makes all departures from prevailing professional standards at
least suspect.
Although some courts attach greater significance than others to deviations
from customary practice, there is always a presumption against providers who
seem to be out of step. 6 The legal formulations vary, but the dominant
the probable preferences and interests of the parties and the public's interest in spreading losses and
deterring injuries. See 1 S. PEGALIS & H. WACHSMAN, AMERICAN LAW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE § 2:1
(1980). This contractarian view of tort law obviously leaves more room for the parties to provide
explicitly for a different set of rights than the law presumes to create. See Epstein, Medical Malpractice:
The Case for Contract, 1 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 87, 94-95 (1976).
3. Although the problem of specifying enforceable duties is presented here in the context of
individual professionals, it also arises with respect to institutional providers of health care, which
supply the services of many individual professionals and are liable for their torts under the doctrine
of respondeat superior. Legal standards governing hospitals as institutions are also frequently
derived by observing industry custom and standards. See, e.g., Darling v. Charleston Community
Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326, 338-39, 211 N.E.2d 253, 260-61 (1965).
4. This article should be read in conjunction with others in the symposium that explore other
ways in which tort rights might be altered. See, e.g., Ginsburg, Kahn, Thornhill & Gambardella,
Contractual Revisions to Medical Malpractice Liability, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 253;
Henderson, Agreements Changing the Forum for Resolving Malpractice Claims, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Spring 1986, at 243; O'Connell, Neo-Vo-Fault Remedies for Medical Injuries: Coordinated Statutory and
ContractualAlternatives, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs., Spring 1986, at 125; Tancredi, Designing a No-Fault
Alternative, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 277. Parties' doubts about their ability to
formulate a meaningful and enforceable alternative standard of care might lead them to try to solve
the malpractice problem in some other way. Obviously, the various approaches can be combined.
5. For another presentation of this explanation, see Epstein, Medical Malpractice, Imperfect
Information, and the ContractualFoundationfor Medical Services, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at
201.
6. For general discussions of the standard of care, indicating the strong de facto presumption
in favor of those practitioners using mainstream methods, see J. KING, THE LAW OF MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE IN A NUTSHELL 42-54 (1977); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 2, § 32; King, In
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principle is that adherence to prevalent professional standards creates an
almost irrebuttable presumption of due care. 7 Even though the law may not
treat a departure from custom as negligence per se or as raising an adverse
presumption, its denial to deviating providers of the benefit of a favorable
presumption increases the likelihood that liability will be found. Some courts
allow physicians to offer in defense of a departure from customary practice the
support of a "respectable minority" of professionals, 8 the existence of an
"honest difference of opinion," 9 or expert testimony that what was done was
reasonable and prudent.' 0 Nevertheless, the best defense is always that the
physician did what most other physicians would have done and that the
practice is approved and generally recognized in the profession as an
appropriate procedure.1 ' Thus, the law creates strong pressure to adhere to
professional custom. Much care that physicians perceive as "defensive
medicine" appears to be a response to the pressure to do more than
individual professionals believe to be necessary and cost-justified.
Although the law's reliance on professional custom creates arguably
excessive pressures to conform to conventional practice styles, it is hard to see
how the law could otherwise define a professional's duty. Indeed, it is not
only natural but efficient-given the absence of other ways of defining
professional duties-for the law to have reference to professional custom. A
private draftsman writing an explicit contract would also find it convenient to
incorporate generally prevailing professional standards by reference. It is
practically impossible to define the obligations of a true professional by any
other means.
Interestingly, this explanation of why professional custom has been widely
used as a legal benchmark also suggests why some contractual modifications
Search of a Standard of Care for the Medical Profession: The "Accepted Practice" Formula, 28 VAND. L. REV.
1213, 1234-75 (1975); McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REV. 549, 605-09
(1959).
7. See, e.g., Downer v. Veilleux, 322 A.2d 82, 88 (Me. 1974) (plaintiff must prove a departure
from the "general custom and practice of those reasonably skilled in the profession"); Bailey v.
Williams, 189 Neb. 484, 486, 203 N.W.2d 454, 456 (1973) (physician must exercise that level of care
and skill that other physicians "would ordinarily exercise and devote to the benefit of their
patients"); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.12 (1985). For the leading exception to the principle that
adherence to custom shields a physician from liability, see Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519
P.2d 981 (1974), in which the court found a physician negligent for not doing a diagnostic test that
was not indicated by medical custom. On that case and on cases varying the locality rule to hold
professionals to standards prevailing in other markets, see Havighurst, Private Reform of Tort-Law
Dogma: Market Opportunities and Legal Obstacles, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 143, 159
n.45.
8. See, e.g., Baldor v. Rogers, 81 So. 2d 658, 660 (Fla. 1954).
9. See, e.g.,
Bruce v. United States, 167 F. Supp. 579, 588-89 (S.D. Cal. 1958); Haase v.
Garfinkel, 418 S.W.2d 108, 114 (Mo. 1967).
10. See, e.g., Hood v. Phillips, 554 S.W.2d 160, 165-66 (Tex. 1977) (reviewing various legal
definitions of the standard of care).
11. On the "accepted practice" formula, which shifts the focus from what is actually done to
what is expected by the profession, see Blair v. Eblen, 461 S.W.2d 370, 373 (Ky. 1970); King, supra
note 6, at 1240-41; see also WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.040(1) (Supp. 1985). By appealing to the ideal of
the profession, this standard prevents hiding behind bad practice, but, by leaving the definition of
standards in professional hands, it fails to solve many of the problems that might prompt private
efforts to seek a less demanding standard. See Havighurst, supra note 7, at 158-59.
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of that basic standard should be acceptable. Custom has been incorporated
into both implied and explicit contracts, not because customary practice is
always optimal and right, but because it is a convenient and efficient way of
specifying enforceable duties. Even though professional custom may be a
good starting point for delineating professional obligations, its use as a
standard may not yield the desired result in all cases. Although custom might
be deemed useful as a general benchmark, particular occasions or
circumstances can be imagined in which departures from custom should be
authorized as a way of improving the quality or lowering the cost of care.
Different consumers or consumer groups might perceive differently the
appropriateness of particular exceptions to the general standard, or they
might have different views concerning the trustworthiness of the particular
providers with whom they deal. The extent to which customary practice
should govern a particular professional relationship depends heavily upon
whether custom is a good or a not-so-good general guide to appropriate
professional performance. 12
In health care at the moment, there are good reasons for doubting that the
prevailing norms and standards of the medical profession are consistently
reliable guides to appropriate practice and the efficient allocation of
resources.' 3 Those norms and standards became customary in an era in
14
which health care was paid for in such a way that cost was virtually no object.
12. In addition to the deficiencies of the customary practice standard mentioned in the next
paragraph, another shortcoming is the difficulty of reliably establishing professional custom. Not
only is there less uniformity of practice than the law seems to assume, see infra note 17 and
accompanying text, but the problem of discovering such consensus as does exist is compounded by
adversary selection in malpractice cases of experts who purport to testify to professional standards.
Thus, even if prevailing standards were deemed acceptable in principle as a benchmark for defining
professional duties, the parties to a medical transaction might conclude that there is no good way to
ascertain such standards and thus be driven to fashion another standard or make some other
modification of the tort system.
13. A leading physician student of quality-of-care issues discusses professional norms as follows:
The one best strategy is. of course, an idealized concept that is difficult, if not impossible, to
specify in practice. One is handicapped, on the one hand, by the great variability in the
manifestations of illness among various subjects. On the other hand, imperfections in
knowledge force practitioners to fall back on personal experience and judgment to fill the gaps.
There is, nevertheless, enough similarity among patients and enough medical knowledge to
allow practitioners with recognized expertise to specify a strategy of care, or a set of alternative
variants, that would serve to define either something close to the best care we can now provide
or a sufficiently high level to be generally acceptable. Thus one codifies the norms of care, and
uses these norms to judge the performance of individual practitioners. These practitioners do,
of course, continue to have the opportunity, indeed the responsibility, to deviate from the norms
without being censured, provided they can show that such deviations are justified because of the
special circumstances of a particular case.
When expert practitioners specify the preferred strategies of care based on what they
consider to be best for patients, and without regard to momentary [sic; read "monetary"] costs,
we have what may be called an absolutist definition of quality.
Donabedian, Quality, Cost, and Clinical Decisions, 468 ANNALS 196, 200 (1983). Introducing the cost
factor leads ultimately, says Donabedian, to "moral ambiguity," id. at 201, and serious tensions that
the profession is poorly prepared to resolve. Because trials of malpractice cases invite the exercise of
hindsight and the invocation of an "absolutist definition of quality," see supra note 12, the legal
system seems likely to inspire inefficient practice.
14. See Havighurst, supra note 7, at 158-59.
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It is therefore doubtful that they reflect an adequate awareness of the tradeoffs between costs and benefits.' 5 In addition, there is now recognition that
many clinical methods embodied in professional standards have only a weak
scientific basis. Numerous deficiencies can be observed in the supposedly
scientific process by which the medical profession determines how specific
medical conditions should be treated.' 6 It appears that many factors that
ought to be taken into account-cost being only one such factor-are
systematically neglected in the profession's collective thinking. Finally,
several students of the industry have recently called attention to the fact that
clinical practices vary widely and inexplicably from place to place.' 7 Given
these reasons to doubt the appropriateness of professional standards, private
parties might well find that customary practice, even though useful as a
starting point in defining duties, ought not to be the definitive measure by
which providers are judged.
The usual response to the discovery that an existing standard is unproven,
inefficacious, or inefficient is to advocate further studies and the alteration of
professional practice patterns to accommodate the new finding.' 8 Such
responses are clearly appropriate, but they do not solve the problem.
Research often cannot definitively resolve differences of opinion, particularly
in the short run. In the meantime, until customary practice is clearly shown to
be unsatisfactory, the pressure to adhere to it remains intense. Moreover,
when new findings do begin to appear, the law imposes special risks on those
who first depart from the old custom, placing a greater burden of proof or
persuasion on those who cannot show that they practiced according to
established norms. Finally, the law, as currently formulated, takes no account
of the possibility that some patients, particularly those who regard their
providers as especially competent and trustworthy, might be willing to rely
upon their providers' judgment and to assume some of the risk of foregoing
unproven or marginally beneficial therapies in return for lower prices. Thus,
15. On the importance of such trade-offs and the low likelihood that they can be taken account
of in professional norms, see Havighurst & Blumstein, Coping with Quality/Cost Trade-offs in Medical
Care: The Case of PSROs, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 6, 12-13, 25-33 (1975); see also supra note 13. Prevailing
custom may be a more reliable gaide to efficient behavior in nonmedical settings, where it reflects
private decisions by buyers and sellers to incur or not to incur the cost of added increments of safety.
See Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32-33 (1972); see also McCoid, supra note 6, at
605-06 (discussing the relevance of custom in nonmedical cases).
16. See Eddy, Clinical Policies and the Quality of Medical Practice, 307 NEW ENG. J. MED. 343-45 n.6
(1982) (specifically observing problems in the perspective and methods of medical researchers, in
clinicians' uses of empiricism, and in incentive systems). Many of the accepted methods of clinical
practice did not achieve their status through scientific demonstration of their superiority in all
relevant respects over other methods.
17. See Variations in Medical Practice, HEALTH AFF., Summer 1984 (symposium). Of particular
interest in this symposium is Wennberg, Dealing with Medical Practice Variations: A Proposalfor Action,
HEALTH AFF., Summer 1984, at 6.
18. Cf Eddy, supra note 16, at 345. "The burden of proof is on anyone who wants to change an
existing policy." Id. Initial recommendations, although often based on limited experience, become
"time honored" and vulnerable to change only with great effort. As an example, "[it took more than
half a century to evaluate and modify the surgical approach to breast cancer." Id. A great deal of
promising reevaluation of medical practice has occurred in recent years, in large measure because of
increased concern about the cost of care.
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the argument that professional standards should not be conclusive is not an
argument that professional standards should not be improved. Indeed, it can
be argued that leaving the door open to agreed-upon departures from
customary standards can actually speed both the discovery of better methods
(by allowing natural experiments) and the implementation of new learning.
III
RESTATING THE PROVIDER'S DUTIES

Drafting a contract explicitly stating a health care provider's duty to
patients is an interesting exercise. There is virtually no judicial guidance
about how it might be done. Case law suggests, of course, that a court may
view the agreement as a contract of adhesion and that its drafter must
therefore be prepared to demonstrate that the terms are not basically unfair.' 9
Proponents of these contracts must also be prepared to confront the charge
that such an attempt to rewrite legal doctrine violates public policy and is
therefore invalid. The cases invoking this principle, however, all appear to
involve exculpatory clauses that go significantly further than anything
proposed here. 20 Moreover, as already noted, there are some good public
policy reasons for approving, not disapproving, at least some contractual
modifications of the applicable standard.
The draftsman should begin by consulting local law. Judicial precedent
may provide useful definitions of terms in addition to indicating that some
approaches or formulations are more promising than others. Statutory law
may present either some special opportunities or special problems that must
be overcome. For example, an Illinois statute provides that releases entered
into prior to treatment are against public policy, but it could be argued that
this provision bars only exculpatory clauses and does not preclude an attempt
merely to modify the prevailing legal standard. 2' A Florida statute that
purports to state the applicable standard of care fully and explicitly 22 might be
read to preclude contractual modifications; nevertheless, the statute does not
explicitly preempt private agreements.
There are a variety of approaches that one can take in drafting a
contractual modification of the applicable standard. The first may be called
the "restatement" approach. This approach would not involve trying to
change the applicable standard, but rather clarifying and shaping it in a
desirable way. A reformer might, for example, review the cases in the
jurisdiction and adopt the terminology that is most favorable and least
ambiguous. A slightly less conservative approach might reach farther afield,
perhaps taking doctrine or statutory language from another state; local courts
might be less likely to declare "unconscionable" language that is the law of
another jurisdiction. Alternatively, the draftsman might set out from scratch
19.
20.
21.
22.

See Havighurst, supra note 7, at 164-68.
Id. at 163-64.
Medical Practice Act § 4 I,ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111,
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.45 (West Supp. 1985).

4478 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985).
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to write language that is intended as an improvement over local law, hoping
to persuade a court later to see the merit in the effort.
An entirely different way of improving the legal climate might be to leave
the substantive standard of care unchanged and to address instead the way in
which breaches of the provider's legal duty can be proved. A patient might
agree only to call expert witnesses having certain special qualifications,
somewhat increasing the chance that the de facto test for negligence applied
in the courtroom will be a realistic one. Other specifications of admissible
evidence could be made. A particularly useful strategy might be to address
the burden of proof, specifying that the plaintiff has not established a prima
facie case just by showing a departure from customary practice.
A variety of approaches could be combined to produce a contract
provision like the following:
The Physician's Duty to You
The Physician warrants that he or she possesses at least the skill and knowledge of
a reasonably competent medical practitioner in the Physician's specialty and

undertakes to you that he or she will exercise that skill and knowledge in a reasonable
and prudent manner in your case. In so doing, the Physician may sometimes depart
from practices customary among other physicians. Such departures shall not be
deemed to breach the foregoing undertaking, however, unless they are expressly

found to have been unreasonable and imprudent; evidence to support such a finding
shall consist solely of the testimony of experts knowledgeable about scientific studies
bearing on the appropriateness of the actions taken and about what, in the light of all
the circumstances including the cost of alternative measures, constitutes appropriate
medical care. You agree that the undertaking in this paragraph fully defines the
Physician's duty to you.

The advantages of this provision are that it leaves adherence to custom as
a substantial (though not necessarily conclusive) defense, prevents departures
from custom from being the basis for any automatic inference of negligence,
and contemplates that scientific studies and cost factors will be considered
before conduct is labeled negligent. The clause thus states a sound legal
principle, one that is appropriate for legislative or judicial adoption. It is fair
to ask how much difference such a clause would make in the outcome of cases.
Although the answer probably is "not much," a jury instructed in accordance
with the provision might appreciate that the issues are hard ones and not to
be resolved on the basis of emotion alone.
A similar approach might be adopted by a group-practice or staff-model
health maintenance organization (HMO) 23 :
The Duty of the Plan's Physicians to You
The Plan warrants that each of its physicians possesses at least the skill and

knowledge of a reasonably competent medical practitioner in his or her specialty and
23. These HMO varieties usually are more closely integrated, have different compensation
arrangements, and exercise more control over their physicians than so-called individual practice
associations (IPA's). See generally AM. MEDICAL Ass'N, HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS (1980).
More loosely organized plans, including IPA's and so-called preferred provider organizations, might
also contract for malpractice relief, but the suggested clause might not be deemed suitable.
A conceptualization helpful in understanding HMO's in the present context is provided by P.
JosKow, CONTROLLING HOSPITAL COSTS: THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION (1981): "[W]e can

certainly conceptualize an individual consumer's choosing an insurance contract with a negligible
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undertakes to you that its physicians will exercise that skill and knowledge in a
reasonable and prudent manner in your case. In so doing, a Plan physician may
sometimes depart from practices customary among other physicians. Such departures
shall not be deemed to breach the foregoing undertaking, however, unless they are
expressly found to have been unreasonable and imprudent; evidence to support such a
finding shall include the testimony of experts knowledgeable about practices
customary among physicians in other organized health plans in which physicians are
not compensated on a fee-for-service basis. In instances where the Plan has consulted
with the Members' Advisory Panel concerning a particular practice or method of
diagnosis or treatment and obtained the Panel's approval of a particular clinical policy,
adherence by the Plan's physicians to that policy shall not be deemed unreasonable
and imprudent unless such approval was obtained by misrepresentation or unless
changes in medical knowledge between the time such approval was obtained and the
time you were treated indicate that continued adherence to such policy was
unreasonable and imprudent. You agree that the undertaking in this paragraph fully
defines the duties of the Plan and its physicians to you.

This provision requires that a plaintiff present evidence of practice
standards in other prepaid plans whose physicians are not paid on a fee-forservice basis, thus letting the jury at least consider the custom that has evolved
in more cost-conscious practice settings. An alternative approach would be to
make such HMO standards the sole source of guidance to the jury, on the
theory that adherence to standards supported by a "respectable minority" is a
defense.2 4 The HMO might prefer, however, not to appear reluctant to have
its practices compared to those of the dominant system.
The other refinement suggested in the foregoing clause is the HMO's use
of a "members' advisory panel" to screen decisions to economize or
otherwise depart from medical custom. Such a panel, which should probably
have the benefit of disinterested expert advice, could be viewed as a vehicle by
which plan subscribers give their "informed consent" to deviations from
accepted standards. Provision is made to ensure full disclosure and to protect
against the possibility that new learning will render an approved clinical policy
obsolete. The absence of explicit approval still leaves the issue of liability to
25
be proved under the enlightened "reasonable and prudent physician" test.
IV
REVISING THE LEGAL TEST FOR LIABILITY

The draftsman might take an entirely different approach to the problem of
an unreasonably demanding standard of care. If the parties believe that the
legal system is unreasonably biased toward finding liability in close cases, they
might elect to raise the threshold of actionable negligence so that many
coinsurance rate but with the restriction that care be provided only by physicians and hospitals who
do so only if it satisfies some reasonable cost-benefit criterion." Id. at 37-38.
24.

See Bovbjerg, The Medical .MalpracticeStandardof Care: HMOs and Customary Practice, 1975 DUKE

L.J. 1375, 1408-14 (proposing "[an HMO custom rule . . . broader than the current 'reputable
minority' doctrine, but narrower than a 'school of practice' rule accepting completely different
philosophies of medical care"). If HMO standards were deemed too low, the higher standards of the
fee-for-service community might be applied. See supra note 7.
25. See, e.g., Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Assoc., 276 Md. 187, 199-200, 349 A.2d
245, 252-53 (1975); Hood v. Phillips, 554 S.W.2d 160, 165-66 (Tex. 1977) (reviewing various legal
definitions of the standard of care).

Page 265: Spring 19861

ALTERING THE STANDARD OF CARE

injuries currently actionable would not be compensable. The following is one
possible formulation:
Limitations on Your Legal Rights Against the Physician
In return for the Physician's acceptance of you as a patient on the terms provided
for in this agreement, you agree that, in any legal action hereafter brought by you
against the Physician for any injury suffered in the course of your treatment, you will
be entitled to recover damages only if such injury was the result of the Physician's
gross negligence. Gross negligence is distinguishable from ordinary negligence and is
characterized by willful neglect of your personal well-being or reckless disregard for
the consequences of some act or omission.

A similar clause might also be used by a hospital to protect itself and its
personnel against suits for ordinary negligence. A contract seeking to limit
the patient to suing only for gross negligence should include a clear definition
of that term, one that not only informs the patient of his rights but could also
be used in instructing the jury. To improve the odds on enforceability, this
definition should certainly be no narrower than, and should perhaps be more
liberal than, that found in local case law or statutes. 2 6 Such a clause would
give a jury an opportunity to penalize any conduct by the provider that they
found to be outrageous, but would result in a denial of compensation in some
cases involving only arguable ordinary negligence. 2 7 If juries are as inclined
to favor plaintiffs as they are reputed to be, there might not be a very large
number of cases in which liability is denied even though objective observers
would find clear fault.
This clause obviously does not purport to define the provider's contractual
obligation to the patient, which would be spelled out elsewhere in the
agreement. Instead, the clause directly forecloses the existing legal remedy
for certain breaches of the provider's duty. Such a contract might be deemed
to offend the Illinois rule that releases are against public policy 28 and would
undoubtedly trouble many other courts. Nevertheless, a substantial case can
29
be made for enforcing such an agreement.
26. Precedent for foreclosing actions for ordinary as opposed to gross negligence appears in
automobile guest statutes. Formulations vary but would be useful in developing a contractual
definition of gross negligence. See generally 60A CJ.S. Motor Vehicles §§ 399.3a, .5-.9 (1969). Other
sources of definitions and relevant principles include the law of punitive damages. See Noe v. Kaiser
Found. Hosps., 248 Or. 420, 435 P.2d 306 (1967); K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 4.2(A)(6) (1980
& Supp. 1983); Annot., 27 A.L.R.3D 1274 (1969). A plaintiff probably should not have to show
intentional harm or malice, however, which some courts require as a prerequisite for punitive
damages. E.g., Ebaugh v. Rabkin, 22 Cal. App. 3d 891, 894, 99 Cal. Rptr. 706, 708 (1972) ("even
gross negligence is not sufficient to justify an award of punitive damages").
27. Application of a gross negligence standard would require expert testimony, and a jury would
not get the case unless a witness was willing to say that the standard had been breached.
28. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
29. An agreement of this kind is almost certainly the most extreme limitation of a health care
provider's liability that a court might be persuaded to enforce. As a general rule, "those who are not
engaged in public service may properly bargain against liability for harm caused by their ordinary
negligence in performance of contractual duty; but such an exemption is always invalid if it applies to
harm wilfully inflicted or caused by gross or wanton negligence." 6A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON
CONrRACTS § 1472, at 596-97 (1962) (citations omitted). As argued in Havighurst, supra note 7, at
145-56, health care has become less a "public service" and more a consumer good in recent years,
weakening the analogy to common carriers and other monopolistic enterprises to which the
foregoing principle has historically been applied. Professors Robinson and Epstein, in arguing that
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Today only a small percentage of the instances of actual provider
negligence result in claims. 30 Explanations for the paucity of suits include the
failure of patients to suspect, or discover, that negligence caused the injury; in
other cases the potential recovery may be too small to prompt a plaintiff's
attorney to invest the necessary effort. Some anecdotal evidence suggests,
however, that many patients forego filing claims that carry some promise of a
favorable result. This can occur because economic losses are covered by
other mechanisms and the patient has no other reason to raise an issue. 3 '
Inaction could also be the result of loyalty to the provider, perhaps as a
positive response to the provider's "bedside manner" or to other positive
features in the provider/patient relationship. Other patients, perhaps
reflecting cultural or subcultural values, 3 2 may have an affirmative distaste for
litigation or may simply love doctors and hate lawyers. 3 3 It is arguable that
even pure exculpatory clauses should be enforced, probably do not contemplate exoneration for
intentional harms. See Robinson, Rethinking the Allocation of Medical Malpractice Risks Between Patients
and Providers, LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 173; Epstein, supra note 2.
30. See P. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 23-25 (1985)

("rough estimate that at most 1 in 10 negligent injuries results in a claim is probably an upper
bound").
31. An acquaintance of the author claims to have once turned down a settlement offer of
$25,000 without suing for the mishap, believing the hospital's clear error was a forgivable one. A
study of accident victims who did not sue describes their thinking as follows:
Fault and liability simply do not coincide [in their minds]. Sometimes payment of money is
[viewed as] inappropriate because there was no financial loss. Or the other person may have
already "paid" in some other way: he may have been very upset, prosecuted, or trying to help.
Punishing the person or making sure it does not happen again may be seen as more appropriate
than compensation. Sometimes the type of fault is not of the appropriate kind-e.g., "He
couldn't really help it," "You couldn't blame him," "He didn't mean to do it," or even "It was
just an accident." This apparent ambivalence over fault and blame need not mean that the
respondents, or the principles they are applying, are confused, but rather that these principles
are complex and flexible, depending on the context and anticipated consequences. These
respondents may be acknowledging that fault can provide grounds for compensation, but not in
their particular case.
Lloyd-Bostock, Fault and Liability for Accidents: The Accident Victim's Perspective, in COMPENSATION AND
SUPPORT FOR ILLNESS AND INJURY 139, 156 (1984); see also Genn, Who Claims Compensation: Factors
Associated with Claiming and ObtainingDamages, in COMPENSATION AND SUPPORT FOR ILLNESS AND INJURY

45, 70-76 (1984).
32. The sociological dimension of the malpractice phenomenon is revealed by Danzon's finding
that urbanization is an important explanation of increased claims frequency. P. DANZON, supra note
30, at 70-75, 80-83.
33. Perhaps the most telling line of argument in support of contractual variations of tort
principles is suggested by the divergence between the legal system's paradigmatic view of itself as a
moral enterprise and consumers' views of its services. For an empirical demonstration of this
divergence, see Lloyd-Bostock, supra note 31 (to which my attention was called by Patrick Atiyah).
This insightful study and discussion-showing that, "contrary to what one might expect, the victim's
attribution of fault for the accident does not predict whether he or she takes steps towards claiming
damages under the tort system," id. at 139-cannot be fully summarized here, but the following
excerpts strongly suggest that the fault system is somewhat dearer to its operators than to its
supposed beneficiaries and that it may reflect values imposed upon rather than derived from the
latter:
[O]ne factor influencing what will be seen as fair in a particular context is the cost of applying
strictly equitable norms. Such norms are frequently abandoned in everyday life in favour of
norms simpler and less costly to apply, and such solutions are accepted as perfectly just.
Abandoning the tort system on grounds of cost may have a greater claim to accord with
"common sense morality" than does retaining it.
Id. at 142-43.
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those persons who do not highly value their right to sue for minor deviations
or minor mishaps should have room to express this disposition at a point in
the transaction where they can obtain an appropriate concession from the
provider. Only in this way can they avoid having to contribute to an insurance
fund that they are much less likely to draw upon than are other, more litigious
types.

34

The legal system is perhaps too inclined to believe that it speaks and sets
values for the community as a whole, that its processes are an unmitigated
blessing on people, and that no one who is fully informed and in his right
mind would ever renounce his chance to buy a ticket in the malpractice
lottery. The contractual strategy recommended here, though not likely to be
adopted soon, makes more sense than most lawyers and judges are apt to
perceive. As argued elsewhere in this symposium, 3 5 consumers should not be
deprived by law of their freedom to opt for fewer costly legal rights than the
legal monopoly seeks to confer upon them.

If the possibilities of alternative legitimate attributions of fault, and alternative definitions of
relationships, are taken into account, the model of social relationships underlying the tort
system becomes much more complex than is usually allowed for by lawyers (or, for that matter,
economists). Many factors other than the causes of the accident will govern not only the victim's
actions in claiming or not claiming, but also his perceptions of, and feelings about the accident.
Such factors may include the prospect of compensation, other aspects of the relationships
involved, and the anticipated costs and benefits of various courses of action.
Id. at 147.
Attributing fault brings with it potential conflict which people may prefer to avoid altogether
rather than resolve. Blaming, holding people liable, and pursuing a legal claim will obviously
have different sorts of impact on relationships between friends, family members, employer and
employee, fellow employees, and those who were strangers until the accident. Where the costs
of blaming (including costs usually ignored by economists) are high and the prospects of benefit
in the form of compensation remote, accidents tend to be seen as "just accidents."
Id. at 155.
Far from feeling that the law is backing him in what he sees as his moral rights, the accident
victim involved in a legal claim seems frequently to feel confused, anxious, and buffeted by the
system.
Id. at 160.
[Tihe evidence that the present system is divisive, and creates more hostility than it dispels, does
not seem to have been given serious enough consideration.
Id. at 161.
34. Controversy has recently arisen surrounding an information service that a physician can
consult, for a fee, to determine whether a particular patient has ever been a plaintiff in a civil action,
thus perhaps revealing a special propensity to sue. See Shwiff, Service Promises to Help Physicians Identify
Plaintiffs; Trial Lawyers Critical, L.A. Daily J., Oct. 23, 1985, at 1, col. 2. The possibility that such
patients might be denied care is troublesome, but private contracts offer a way to avoid this result
and also to make those who are most likely to invoke their tort rights pay for them.
35. Havighurst, supra note 7.

